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Chapter 1 Transboundary Environmental Pollution and Cooperation 





This chapter makes a history review on disparity in concerns and cooperation 
for transboundary environmental pollution between China and Japan.  China has 
placed high priority on economic growth and energy security, but the structural 
problems of a heavy reliance on coal, inefficient energy production and 
consumption, and increasing energy consumption does not allow China to take 
effective measures to reduce SO2 emissions, let alone transboundary acid rain and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Japan, on the other hand, used to be mainly concerned about transboundary 
acid rain and provided environmental assistance in support of air pollution control 
projects, but failed to change China’s attitude. Since the Third Conference of 
Parties for United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), a reduction in GHGs has been given a higher policy priority.  Japan 
also requires emerging countries to establish some reduction targets in order that 
they do not offset the emission reduction activities of Annex I countries. 
However, rising global concerns over climate change increases expectation 
that the CDM can be a tool for reducing this disparity and encouraging 
environmental cooperation.  China recognizes that the CDM can be a useful tool 
for attaining diplomatic and economic goals, and has modified its stance to 
actively utilize the CDM to maximize its benefit.  Japan has become active in 
finding prominent Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI) projects as a cost-effective means to attain the GHG 
reduction target.   
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China has rapidly increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the process of 
high-speed economic growth.  China became the largest emitter in the world in 2007, 
followed by the United State, Russia, India, the EU and Japan (Figure 1-1).  Under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), GHG 
emission reduction targets were established for Annex I countries including the US, 
the EU, Japan and Russia.  The EU, Japan and Russia signed the Kyoto Protocol and 
accepted their reduction target while the US has not.  On the other hand, non-Annex 
I countries have been given no reduction obligations despite their rapid increase in 
GHG emissions over recent years.  China’s emissions have increased considerably, 
and it is expected to surpass the US as the world’s largest emitter of GHGs in the 
coming decades. 
China’s policy priority, however, is economic growth, and it is only concerned 
with environmental issues where they constrain that growth. By contrast, Japan had 
been concerned about transboundary acid rain problems and provided environmental 
aid to reduce sulfur emission in China.  However, when China changed its focus 
toward reducing sulfur emissions, Japan changed its policy priority toward GHGs and 
is now more concerned with reducing GHG emissions in China in pursuit of certified 
emission reductions (CERs). 
This chapter examines history of energy and transboundary environmental 
policies in China and Japan, and clarifies how CDM has offered opportunity for 
environmental cooperation between them. 
1-2 Energy and environmental policies in China 
Given the level of national poverty before the 1980s, China made economic 
development its highest priority under the Reform and Open-door Policy.  As 
economic growth accelerated, serious energy shortages occurred, with most cities 
experiencing episodic brownouts or rotating blackouts, resulting in underutilized 
industrial capacity.  Recognizing that energy security is indispensable for sustaining 
economic growth, the Chinese government prioritized the enhancement of energy 
supply capacity. 
To increase energy supply, the government began to implement institutional 
reforms in the 1980s.  It abandoned the state’s monopoly on energy supply and 
allowed regional and corporate entities and joint ventures to enter into the production 
market.  China’s State Council promulgated the “Provisional Regulations on 
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Promoting Fund-Raising for Investment in the Power Sector and Implementing 
Different Power Prices” in 1985 in order to encourage independent power producers 
(IPPs), including foreign economic entities, to enter into the power generation market 
under long-term contracts. This encouraged township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
to actively invest in coal mining and production (Horii, 2000).  The regulation also 
provided guidelines for raising investment funds for the power sector so that the state 
could reduce its share of financing capital costs (Feng, 2003).  A new pricing policy 
was also implemented for power generated from newly built power plants.  Under 
this policy, prices were determined by cost-plus principle.  This guaranteed IPPs 
sufficient profits by allowing them sell the power at a price that could recover capital 
and operational costs over a relatively short term, generally within ten years, 
regardless of efficiency (Li et al., 2003).  Hence, this policy provided a good 
incentive to invest in coal-fired thermal power generation, and this, along with other 
efforts, resolved the power shortage problem by the mid-1990s. 
Regardless of these efforts, China’s energy sector could not overcome the tradeoff 
between expansion of supply capacity on the one hand, and a structurally heavy 
reliance on coal and its inefficient use on the other (Hatch, 2003).  The share of coal 
used for power generation in China was 96% in the 1950s and 88% in the 1960s.  
Although this share dropped to 70-76% by the 1980s, China remains the biggest 
consumer of coal in the world because total production has continued to increase 
(Figure 1-2).  This predominance of coal is principally a function of the large 
indigenous deposits, but government policy to increase the capacity of thermal power 
plants has also increased China’s reliance on coal.  The Ministry of Water Resources 
and Electric Power (MWREP) preferred to construct thermal plants instead of 
hydroelectric ones, and smaller hydropower stations over larger ones due to 
advantages of cost and time savings.  Thermal power plants were less expensive to 
construct, came on line more quickly, and output was more reliable and easily 
controlled than either nuclear or hydropower plants.  Moreover, prices for electric 
power did not accurately reflect either cost of production or the real mix of resources 
available for generation in each region (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988: 102).  The 
government also promoted the substitution of coal in place of crude oil as the fuel 
used in thermal power plants, for the latter could be exported to bring in scarce hard 
foreign currency.  As a result, electric power supplied from coal-fired thermal power 
plants has increased tremendously, and accordingly the share of coal in energy supply 
has increased substantially since the 1980s. 
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This capacity enhancement policy led to an increase in the number of small and 
inefficient coal-fired thermal power plants.  By the end of the 1980s, the share of 
thermal power in total power generation plants with less than a 100MW capacity was 
over 40%.  Although this share has been shrinking, overall capacity had doubled by 
2003 (Table 1-1).  The average size of thermal power plants has generally been very 
small, and their efficiency rate less than three-fourths compared with those in Japan 
(Michaelowa et al., 2003). China’s inefficient use of energy can be explained by its 
reliance on the industrial sector, especially heavy industries.  Given the military 
containment policy of the US and the USSR alongside the limited availability of 
imported capital and technologies, China had no choice but to create heavy industries 
for the purpose of national security.  The energy and resource intensity of these 
industries is higher than that of other industries, and by the 1990s, three sub-sectors 
of heavy industry—chemicals, nonmetal minerals, and smelting and pressing of 
ferrous metals—shared over 40% of energy consumption. 
Low levels of energy efficiency have been prevalent throughout various sectors.  
Most industrial boilers were small, with an efficiency of around 50-60%, and millions 
of coal-fired household stoves had a 10-15% efficiency rate, compared with 80-95% 
for natural gas (Hatch, 2003).  In addition, energy and electricity prices in the 
centrally planned economy were set at a low level, which increased demand and 
consumption, and acted as a disincentive for conservation. 
Increased reliance on coal and inefficient use of energy has led to serious 
environmental problems, especially air pollution.  Dust and SO2 emissions have 
increased, although the former decreased in the mid-1990s.  Among various sources, 
the industrial sector has discharged the largest amount of SO2, followed by the 
residential sector.  Within the industrial sector, electric power has the largest share, 
followed by non-metal, chemical, ferrous and non-ferrous metals.  The share, as well 
as emission volume of the power sector, has recently grown even larger (Figure 1-3).  
This suggests that small inefficient power plants that use coals with a high sulfur 
content have been operating amid the recent rapid economic growth. 
The World Bank (1997) estimated that, in 1995, domestic pollution from SO2 
emissions in China caused economic damage of RMB 352.5 billion from dry 
deposition and 41.4 billion from wet deposition, and the total amounted to 7.1% of 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Table 1-2).  Although estimated results vary by 
researcher, such economic damage, along with a widening income gap, have 
potentially produced social unrest. 
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When it became apparent in the late 1990s that the power shortage problem had 
been resolved, and that there was an oversupply of coal, China once more began to 
implement institutional reforms in the energy sector in order to improve energy 
efficiency and reduce environmental damage.  The government began to remove 
energy subsidies in order to slow demand, and also forced the closure of more than 
thirty thousand small and inefficient coal mining during 1998-2000.  This resulted in 
a sharp drop in coal production and in the share of coal for power production, 
although small mining operations were said to have continued illegally (Figure 1-2).  
It also forcefully shut down small power plants with a capacity of less than 50MW. 
In the power sector, revision of the Electricity Law in 1996 separated the business 
function of the Ministry of Electric Power from the government/regulatory body.  In 
1997, the Ministry of Electric Power was abandoned completely and the State Power 
Corporation was created in its place.  The goal was to separate utility business 
management from government oversight, and to establish independent utility entities.  
The former Ministry’s governmental, or regulatory, responsibilities were allocated to 
the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) and State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC). 
Air pollution control policy was enhanced during the Ninth Five-year Plan period 
(1996-2000).  The National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA) 
revised the Air Pollution Act in 1995 to introduce a total pollutants load control for 
several pollutants, such as black smoke, dust, and SO2.  It also designated SO2 and 
acid rain control zones in 1998.  During the Tenth Five-year Plan (2001-2005), the 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 1 required all areas to cut 
emissions of designated pollutants by 10%, and the SO2 and acid rain control zones to 
cut them by 20%.  However, the NEPA lacks the financial resources to enforce these 
policies.  It published the “Trans-Century Green Project Program” that listed 
pollution sources that had caused serious environmental degradation and 
environmental projects that should be urgently implemented.  Through this program, 
it requested foreign governments and international development institutions to 
provide financial aid. 
Since 2000, air pollution control policy has been strengthened.  In 2003, the 
SEPA published regulations for coal-fired thermal power plants that required (a) the 
construction and expansion of coal-fired thermal power plants to be basically 
abandoned in the construction areas of large and medium-size cities, and (b) fuel-gas 
desulfurization (FGD) to be installed when construction or expansion of coal-fired 
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thermal power plants occurred within the SO2 and acid rain control areas.  The 
central government also developed a natural gas pipeline from the Western region to 
the Eastern coastal areas.  In 1992, in order to provide an economic incentive to 
reduce emissions, the SEPA created a pollutants levy that exclusively targeted SO2; 
since then it has reformed the existing levy system gradually expanding its area and 
raising the tariff 2.  It began to charge the levy in proportion to the amount of 
emissions, regardless of compliance with emissions standards.  The SEPA initiated a 
trial SO2 emission trading program in several cities and provinces.  Finally, in 2003, 
the government published the “Program of Action for Sustainable Development in 
China in the Early 21st Century” to highlight ecological protection, environmental 
protection, and pollution control as priority areas. 
Despite these industrial reforms and implementations of environmental projects, 
reliance on coal has increased, energy use has become less efficient, and local air 
pollution has worsened following the rapid economic growth since 2002.  Due to 
reduced investment in thermal power plants, many provinces suffered power shortages 
when faced with rapid increases in demand because generation capacity could not be 
expanded quickly enough.  In the process of capacity development, locally owned 
power plants could be constructed easily without the need to install FGD systems and 
many small and inefficient plants may well have been constructed and started 
operating owing to local governments preferentially purchasing power from them, a 
lack of monitoring and enforcement of SO2 emission control as well as cost 
advantages.  This has led to the insufficient use of capacity of the State Power 
Company’s larger thermal power plants (Horii, 2006).  Overall, this has increased 
SO2 emissions from power plants, and subsequently total sulfur emissions, which 
have surpassed the amount of 1995 (Table 1-3).  Given the gradual improvement of 
air quality in the inner areas of the industrial cities, this implies that air pollution and 
its damage may have been displaced to the outskirts and rural areas. 
The Eleventh Five-year Plan (2006-2010) emphasizes a change in pattern of 
economic growth toward a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society, 
requiring a reduction of 10% in SO2 emissions and 20% in energy consumption.  The 
SEPA began to require the coal mining industry to invest in safety in the work place, 
or otherwise be shut down.  After legislation of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Act in 2003, the SEPA has often withheld approval for power plant 
construction, given orders to stop construction, and even to forcefully pull down 
partially constructed power plants in cases where it judged they did not comply with 
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the requirements of the EIA.  The SEPA expects these measures to provide a 
deterrent to install small inefficient coal mining and power plants. 
However, it demands tremendous efforts to overcome the structural problems of a 
heavy reliance on coal, inefficient energy production and consumption, and increasing 
SO2 emissions.  On the one hand, the government continues to place priority on the 
security of energy supply to ensure sustainable economic growth.  Only when 
projections are that electric power will be oversupplied in near future can the SEPA 
rigorously enforce the regulations.  It is very unlikely that the SEPA will be allowed 
to continue stringent enforcement when China faces an energy shortage again.  On 
the other hand, locally owned coal mining and power plants constitute an important 
source of income for local governments and provide an employment opportunity to 
local economies.  Local governments have strong incentives to continue the 
operation of small coal mining and power plants, despite them being inefficient and 
heavy polluters, even when the central government wants them shut down.  This 
local attitude has delayed the structural reform of the energy industry and the 
introduction of energy-efficient production technology.  To attain the energy saving 
target in the 11th Five-Year Plan, the central government declared that it would take 
energy saving performance into serious consideration when evaluating leaders of local 
governments. 
1-3 Environmental concerns in Japan 
By the 1980s, Japan had reduced SO2 emissions significantly by adopting several 
measures: (a) a switch to liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a fuel, (b) FGD installation, 
(c) energy conservation, (d) structural change of industries, and (e) a shift to nuclear 
power generation.  However, it has suffered from damage caused by acid rain since 
the 1990s.  Japanese people suspect that sulfur emissions from China have caused 
increased sulfur depositions and acid rain in Japan.  However, scientific research has 
shown mixed results.  Huang et al. (1994) claim that China’s contribution was only 
2% while Ikeda (1995) shows it amounts to 25% (Table 1-4).  Calori et al. (2001) 
estimate that in 1990, Japanese anthropogenic emissions contributed almost 50% of 
total sulfur deposition while the contribution from China was 21%, whereas in 1995, 
the Japanese contribution declined to 38% while China’s increased to 40%. 
Due to Japan’s growing concerns over transboundary acid rain, and alongside its 
technological advantage and a commitment to increase environmental official 
development assistance (ODA), the Japanese government has provided a huge amount 
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of environmental ODA to reduce industrial and urban air pollution in North and 
Northeast China, where the sources of acid rain are deemed to be located.  According 
to data of the Development Assistance Committee, Japan has provided China with 
US$ 10.2 billion of ODA for the environmental area during 1995-2004 3 .  
Environmental ODA, as a share of total ODA, increased to 27.2% during 1996-2000, 
and to over 70% during 2000-2001.  By sector, Japan has focused primarily on 
activities in the transportation and energy sectors 4, followed by water and sanitation, 
and flood protection.  Japan has provided environmental aid to the power and energy 
sector mainly for thermal power plant renovation, installation of electric scrubbers 
and FGD systems, and increasing capacity of transmission and distribution.  Such 
assistance directly or indirectly reduces SO2 emissions by lowering transmission loss 
and raising energy efficiency. Japan has also provided financial aid to construct 
large-scale coal gas supply systems and district heating systems that enables local 
governments to replace a large number of small inefficient industrial boilers and 
coal-fired household stoves.  It is estimated that by 2003, Japanese ODA assisted 
projects had reduced SO2 emissions by 190,000 tons annually, which amounts to a 
4.9% reduction that China realized through environmental policies during 1996-2003 
(Mori, 2008a). 
However, Japanese aid for SO2 emission reduction in China faced several 
difficulties in implementation (Mori, 2008b).  Some industrial pollution control 
assistance projects failed to attain their planned environmental performance amid 
industrial restructuring in the transitional period.  Privatization makes it difficult to 
provide aid for industrial pollution control due to fear of criticism that such aid 
contradicts the polluter pays principle.  Exploitation and transmission of natural gas 
from West China has made aid for coal gasification plant redundant.  Rapid 
urbanization has forced industry to relocate to areas outside the cities and to install 
more efficient systems and reduction pollution, but relocation may make pollution 
control investment to the existing plants redundant when the government ordered 
abandon of the old plants. 
This, together with a shift in its environmental ODA provision toward sewerage 
systems and reforestation and toward China’s rapid economic growth, resulted in 
disincentives for the Japanese government to continue environmental ODA to China.  
With recent strained diplomatic tensions, as symbolized by protests against Japan in 
April 2005, Japan and China agreed that Japan would terminate provision of ODA 
loans to China in 2008. Thus, environmental ODA is no longer a financial mechanism 
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to promote air pollution control in China. 
While Japan is now less concerned about transboundary acid rain problems, its 
concern over GHG emissions reduction has increased.  This shift became apparent 
after 1997 when Japan, as an Annex I country, agreed at the third Conference of 
Parties (COP3) held in Kyoto, Japan to reduce GHG emissions by 6% in the first 
commitment period (2008-2012).  Despite this agreement, Japan’s CO2 emissions 
increased to 1.355 billion tons in 2004, which amounts to 108% of the 1990’s 
emission level.  This means that Japan should reduce GHG emissions by 14% if it is 
to attain the Kyoto target. 
In 1998, Japan enacted the “Outline for Promotion of Efforts to Prevent Global 
Warming” as a basic plan, but the Outline established no specific reduction actions, 
and thus no sanctions for noncompliance 5.  As a result, GHG emissions increased by 
6.9% in 1999 when compared to the amount in 1990. 
Japan revised the Outline in 2002 to conform with the rules agreed in the 
Marrakesh Accords, which, for example, required Annex I parties to use Kyoto 
flexible mechanisms as “supplemental to domestic action” (Decision15/CP.7) 6.  The 
Outline adjusted the measures proposed to attain the target and adopted a gas-by-gas 
approach.  It specified a 2% reduction from innovative technological development 
and greater efforts on the part of citizens. It also adjusted the reduction by Kyoto 
flexible mechanisms to 1.6% from 1.8%. 
Nonetheless, the 2002 Outline does not allocate a reduction target to each sector 
or firm, thus effective measurement and enforcement of reductions is not possible.  
The volume of GHG emissions has remained more or less the same over the past few 
years.  Demand for cheap energy such as coal is increasing, despite its higher GHG 
emission impact 7. 
To enhance the effectiveness of the 2002 Outline, the Cabinet decided to adopt the 
Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan in 2005.  The Plan consists of additional 
domestic measures, absorption by sinks and other means, and utilization of Kyoto 
flexible mechanisms; these are expected to reduce GHG emissions by 6.5%, 3.9%, 
and 1.6% respectively.  To further domestic measures, the Ministry of the 
Environment proposed a carbon tax and implemented a pilot emissions trading, but in 
vain due to fierce opposition from industries.  This forces the government to rely 
more on the Kyoto flexible mechanisms. 
Among the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, Japan has prepared and employed the 
CDM more often than JI and the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS).  The New Energy 
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and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) has assisted capacity 
building for the CDM since 2003.  The Japan Kyoto Mechanism Acceleration 
Program was established in 2004 to support potential and actual CDM projects both 
technically and financially.  In response, Japanese entities have since proposed and 
implemented many CDM projects.  Up to November 2008, the Japanese government 
has approved 408 CDM projects of which 108 have already been approved by the 
CDM Executive Board. 
Soon after the Democracy Party of Japan had taken over the government, the 
prime minister pledged to cut GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 from 1990 levels at the 
UN Climate Change Summit in 2009, on the condition that major emitters, such as the 
United States and china would make a significant reduction.  To achieve this 
“ambitious” target, the government prepared the Climate Change Bill that stipulates 
adoption of policies and measures such as emission trading scheme, carbon tax, and 
feed-in-tariff for renewable energy.  However, it is suspected that Japan can attain 
this target only by domestic measures.  Kyoto flexible mechanisms will continue to 
play an essential role in this regard. 
1-4 China’s CDM strategy and climate change policy 
China has long been skeptical about climate change, and has not been active in 
international negotiations.  It has not formulated any policies specific to climate 
change, although policies aimed at SO2 emissions and acid rain control might have 
unintentionally resulted in a GHG reduction.  Recently, it has formulated energy 
saving policies and established a renewable energy development strategy, but did so 
only in response to the recent surge in oil price and subsequent international concern 
over China’s active resource extraction around the world. 
Only after the structures of the Kyoto mechanisms evolved and understanding of 
the mechanisms and their potential benefits to China became clear, did it become less 
skeptical and more receptive toward climate change, and especially the CDM.  China 
perceives the CDM as a measure to help it attain economic and diplomatic goals.  It 
also recognizes that the CDM will bring large amounts of windfall finance and 
advanced technologies to China.  As the World Bank et al. (2004) show, the CDM is 
expected to bring to China such potential benefits as (a) net foreign investment, up to 
$475 million, (b) higher rates of efficiency improvement in energy end-use and 
electricity generation, (c) a 0.5% annual GDP increase through investment and 
localization of advanced technologies, (d) local economic development through 
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technology transfers and tax revenue, and (e) resource efficiency, through the use of 
waste for energy generation and more efficient use of energy. 
This indicates that the CDM may provide China with an opportunity to sustain 
economic growth without an increasing reliance on coal and inefficient energy use, 
and thus may create room for changing the aforementioned tradeoff between increases 
in energy supply capacity on the one hand, and a greater reliance on coal and less 
efficient use on the other.  Development of renewable energy enables the government 
to respond to growing electric power demand while still reducing coal consumption.  
Transfer, localization, and diffusion of advanced technologies may enhance energy 
efficiency, save energy, and lead to a reduction in coal consumption.  
This expectation, along with other economic and diplomatic motivations, has 
prompted China to stimulate as many CDM projects.  It published the “Measures for 
Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China” in 
2005, and to formulate the China's National Climate Change Programme in 2007 that 
outlines objectives, basic principles, key areas of actions, as well as policies and 
measures to address climate change for the period up to 2010.  To obtain the 
maximum benefit from CDM projects, the Measure stipulates that the government of 
China and the project owner should jointly own the revenue from the transfer of CERs, 
and Chinese entities should have more than half of the stake of the project owner. 
Moreover, it designates that energy efficiency improvement, development and 
utilization of new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and utilization as 
preferred types of projects in order to attract foreign investments to these fields. 
Still, China avoids making international commitment to the reduction of GHG 
emissions.  China still has large number of poor farmers.  Despite of the reduction 
of absolute poverty, income gap has been widened between East and West, and urban 
and rural areas.  The government recognizes that economic growth and urbanization 
is indispensable to mitigate poor peoples’ discontent with the widening income gap.  
This recognition, along with its leading position of developing countries in the 
international negotiation, made China oppose to the GHG reduction on the name of 
“common but differentiated responsibility.” 
International society gradually recognized China’s this attitude as barriers to the 
post-2012 climate regime.  It raised concern about tariff adjustment measures to 
imports from non-commitment countries, reasoning that the latter could dump the 
climate mitigation cost to increase exports. 
To take the balance, Chinese government finally published climate change policies 
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as a domestic commitment at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in 
September 2009 and then committed to reduce GHG emissions by 40-45% per GDP by 
2020.  To achieve the remarkable progress, it made a draft bill on climate change in 
2010. 
1-5 Conclusion 
This chapter makes historical review over the priority of transboundary 
environmental pollution and shows the between China and Japan.  China has placed 
high priority on economic growth and energy security, but the structural problems of a 
heavy reliance on coal, inefficient energy production and consumption, and increasing 
emission of SO2 do not allow it to take effective measures on SO2 emission reduction, 
let alone transboundary acid rain and GHG emission reduction. 
Japan, on the other hand, used to be highly concerned about transboundary acid 
rain, and provided huge amount of environmental assistance to China in support of air 
pollution control projects.  However, Japan reduced this aid due to China’s shift of 
focus toward other environmental problems, its own toward GHG emission reductions, 
its tight fiscal constraints and less support from Japanese citizens over government 
assistance to China.  On the other hand, it became active in finding prominent CDM 
and JI projects as a cost-effective means to attain GHG emission reduction targets, 
considering the higher marginal costs required for Japanese domestic GHG emission 
reduction measures.  This action is stimulated by the political change in 2009 that 
followed by the international commitment on a 25% reduction of GHG emissions by 
1990 level.  Japan also requires a few developing countries to establish some 
reduction targets in order that they do not offset the emission reduction activities of 
Annex I countries. 
After having recognized that the CDM could be used as a tool to attain diplomatic 
and economic goals, China modified its attitude to actively utilize the CDM to 
maximize its own benefits.  Though China maintains an opposition to reduction 
target setting for developing countries, this adjustment in attitude is expected to 
enhance mutual cooperation between China and Japan for mitigating transboundary 
environmental problems. 
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1 NEPA was reorganized into SEPA in the 1998 bureaucrat reorganization.  Ranking 
of the minister was upgraded while the ministry lost its key coordinating function. 
2 The SO2 levy was introduced at a rate of RMB 0.20/kg in 1992 in Guangzhou and in 
eight other cities where there was serious acid rain.  In 1998, the levy was 
extended to the SO2 and acid rain control zones.  The rate was raised to RMB 
0.6/kg for three trial cities: Jilin, Hangzhou and Zhengzhou.  This rate was 
extended to cover the entire country in 2003. 
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3 DAC defines an activity as environmental-oriented, thus environmental ODA if an 
activity is intended to produce an improvement, or something that is determined as 
an improvement, in the physical and/or biological environment of the recipient 
country, area or target group concerned, or if it includes specific actions to 
integrate environmental concerns with a range of development objectives through 
institutional building and/or capacity development (DCD/DAC/ENV96(14)). 
According to this definition, economic infrastructure and services, such as activities 
promoting sustainable use of energy resources as well as social ones, and 
sustainable natural resource management are classified as environmental-oriented 
activity. 
4 Activities in the energy sector include rehabilitation of thermal power plants and 
transmission and distribution systems as well as investment in small hydropower 
plants and renewable energy. 
5 See Ministry of Environment, Japan, 2003, “Concerning GHG Emission in 2002”. 
6 The Kyoto Protocol also requires supplementary of international emissions trading 
(article 17) and joint implementation (article 6.1(d)). With regards to the CDM 
(article 12.3(b)), supplementary is described as being when certified emissions 
reductions (CER) “contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments”. Correspondingly, the Marrakech Accord 
has no quantified goal for usage of Kyoto flexible mechanisms, but assesses some 
constraint of supplementary in relation to domestic action. 
7 See the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Japan (2003). 
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Figure 1-1 World CO2 emissions in 1990 and 2009 
 
  























































Figure 1-2 Development of energy production in China 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
Figure 1-3 SO2 Emissions by sector (thousand tons) 
Source: State Environmental Protection Administration of China, Annual Statistic Report on 
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Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products Nonmetal Mineral Products
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals Smelting and Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals




Table 1-1 Number and capacity of thermal power plants by size 





Table 1-2 Estimated economic damage by air pollution 
 Source: Lee (1999); Li and Warford et al., (2004). 
 
 
Health Acid rain Total
Liu and Wang (1998) 1980 44.0 26.5 16.7
Guo and Chang (1990) 1983 38.0 49.8 124.0 15.6
Qu (1994) 1988 95.0 n.a 6.8
Smil (1996) 1988 43.7 124.8 9.5
Smil and Mao (1998) 1990 98.6 38.9 151.0 7.6
Sun (1997) 1992 26.0 17.9 60.5 2.3
Xia  (1998) 1992 20.2 14.0 58.9 2.2
Xu (1998) 1993 13.8 16.0 39.1 1.1
Chinese Academy of Social
Science (1998)




World Bank (1997) 1995 352.5 41.4 407.2 7.1
Damage Cost (Nominal,

























300-600MW 695 223,690 30.7
100-300MW 257 36,090 49.4 476 70,560 37.8 605 90,170 35.3 333 70,670 9.7
50-100MW 211 10,780 14.8 354 18,120 9.7 397 10,710 4.2 711 92,170 12.6
Less than
50MW
1,172 15,820 21.7 2,377 28,600 15.3 2,924 34,900 13.6 6,827 127,620 17.5
Sum - 73,030 100.0 - 186,520 100.0 - 255,720 100.0 8,901 729,310 100.0
69,240 37.1 46.9119,94033932 10,340 14.2 206
1988 1998 2003 2008
 Ch1-19 
Table 1-3 Plan and progress of total pollutants load control (thousand tons) 
Source: SEPA Planning and Financial Bureau (2002), and National Bureau Statistics and 




Table 1-4 Estimated contribution to sulfur deposition in Japan (%) (1990) 
Model Sources of Deposition 
 Japan Volcanoes China Korean 
Peninsula 
Ichikawa et al. (1995) 40 18 25 16 
Ikeda et al. (1995) 37 28 25 10 
Carmichael et al. (1995) 38 45 10 7 
Huang et al. (1994) 94 3 2 
Chinese Academy of Science (1995) 85 10 4 
Calori et al. (2001)(note) 38 9 40 13 
Note: This estimation is for the year 1995. 
Source: Yamamoto (2008). 
 
1995 2000 2000 2005 2005 2010 2008
Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual
Sulfer Dioxide 23,695 24,600 19,950 18,000 25,494 22,950 23,212
   Industrial sector 18,460 22,000 16,125 14,500 18,914 - 19,914
   Two control zones - - 13,160 10,530 - - -
Black smoke 17,436 17,500 11,650 10,485 11,825 - 9,016
Dust from industry 17,312 17,000 10,920 9,000 9,112 - 5,849
